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INTRODUCTION
Tenancies-in-common are one of the oldest forms of interests in real
estate.' Although the traditional tenancy-in-common remains intact, the
modem concept based on fractionalized ownership has experienced a
controversial evolution.2 In the 1990's, investment companies developed
the syndicated tenancy-in-common (TIC) structure by packaging tenant-
in-common ownership interests together with other arrangements.3 This
new TIC investment vehicle offered undivided fractionalized ownership of
institutional4 grade property with limited management responsibilities.5
For the first time, smaller investors who were financially unable to invest
in a sizeable, high-quality, income-producing property6 on their own could
participate as part of a group.
7
Initially, TICs were offered and sold as securities, not interests in real
estate.8 At the turn of the twenty-first century, 9 however, the TIC industry
began to experience significant growth,10 and real estate professionals
1. Early English common law acknowledged three legal forms for the concurrent
ownership of property, one of which was the tenancy-in-common. United States v. Craft,
535 U.S. 274, 279 (2002).
2. The tenancy-in-common continues to be defined as an undivided joint owner-ship
interest held by two or more persons, each having a possessor right, in the same piece of
land. 20 AM. JuR. 2D Cotenancy and Joint Ownership § 32 (2008).
3. See KATHY HESHELOW, EFFORTLESS CASH FLow: THE ABC's OF TIC's (TENANT
IN COMMON PROPERTIES) 9, 10 (iUniverse, Inc. 2006).
4. Id. at 1 (noting that TIC properties include sizeable high quality real estate such
as office buildings, shopping centers, and apartment complexes).
5. Id. at 7 ("TICs are passive income properties with no management and no daily
responsibilities or headaches.").
6. Id. at 1-2; see also Terence Floyd Cuff, Avoiding Ticky Tacky TICs: Some
Comments on Investing in TICs and Avoiding the Pig in a Poke, 034 ALI-ABA 795, 797
(2006).
7. Cuff, supra note 6, at 797 (stating that TICs provide small investors with access
to the market for institutional properties and "provide unsophisticated investors with the
illusion of simplicity").
8. See, e.g., Alvin Robert Thorup, TIC or Treat: How Tenant-In-Common Real
Estate Sales Can Avoid the Reach of the Securities Laws, 34 REAL EST. L.J. 422 (2006).
9. In 2002, the Internal Revenue Service issued a revenue ruling clarifying the
conditions under which real estate owners can defer capital gains and other tax liabilities
by exchanging TICs as like-kind property under I.R.C. § 1031. Rev. Rul. 2002-22, 2002-
1 C.B. 733 (setting forth guidelines for obtaining a ruling that TIC interest will not be
treated as a security for federal income tax purposes); see also I.R.C. § 103 1(a)(1) (2000)
(establishing that under special circumstances, a taxpayer can defer tax liability that
would otherwise be imposed as a result of the capital gains from real property).
10. The issuance of Revenue Ruling 2002-22 caused an explosion in the TIC
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seized the opportunity to get a "slice of the pie" and garner extensive
profit by selling TICs as real estate rather than securities.1" To that end, a
heated debate arose involving the question of under what circumstances, if
any, the offer and sale of TIC interests will not constitute the offer and
sale of a security under federal securities laws. 12 This debate fueled a turf
war 13 between those who "bet the farm" by offering and selling TICs as
investments in real estate, and those who properly sell TICs as securities
subject to the regulatory regime of the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (SEC). 14
Offering and selling TICs as real estate is a sponsor-focused approach,
designed to benefit and protect the sponsor, not the investor. 15 The sponsor
disregards protections that were enacted for the benefit of investors in
return for a chance to gain more profit.' 6 This strategy is counterintuitive:
the notion that TICs can simply be structured as real estate embraces a
"bet the farm," all-or-nothing approach that circumvents statutory purpose
and congressional intent and deprives investors of the disclosure require-
ments and anti-fraud provisions that were enacted for their benefit. 17
industry. See HESHELOW, supra note 3, at 9 (indicating that in the aftermath of the
issuance of Revenue Ruling 2002-22, the TIC industry exploded); see also Alan J.
Berkeley, Real Estate Interests in Securities: TICS/DSTS, in Regulation D Offerings and
Private Placements 75 ALI-ABA 727, 729 (2006) (explaining that 2003 witnessed $150
million in sales of TIC interests; 2004 witnessed $2 billion in sales; 2005 witnessed $4
billion in sales; and the sales numbers may "reach $40-50 billion annually by 2010").
11. Thorup, supra note 8, at 426 (articulating an investment structure under which
TICs are allegedly offered and sold as real estate and not securities).
12. See, e.g., HESHELOW, supra note 3, at 32 (noting that the question of whether
TICs are securities or real estate has been hotly debated in the TIC industry since 2002).
13. See generally Todd Snyder, TICs as Real Estate or Securities: Insignificant
Sponsors?, TIC TALK, 4th Quarter 2007, available at http://www.snyderkearney.com/Por
tals/0/TICs%20as%2OReal%2OEstate%20or%20Securities.pdf.
14. The Securities and Exchange Commission is an autonomous regulatory body
charged with administering and enforcing federal securities laws. See generally RICHARD
W. JENNINGS ET AL., SECuRrnES REGULATION 98 (7th ed. 1992 & Supp. 1996) (explain-
ing the authority possessed and the obligations undertaken by the SEC).
15. For the purposes of this Note, the term "sponsors" refers to those persons and
entities that offer and sell TICs.
16. See generally Stephanie Ann Miranda, Can Pre-Purchase Entrepreneurial Ef-
forts Satisfy the Fourth Prong of the Howey Test? A Critique of SEC v. Life Partners,
Inc., 38 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 269, 274 (1997) (stating three principles underlying
federal securities law).
17. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77b, 77s-77t (2000) (setting
forth the statutory definitions and other requirements that govern the offer and sale of
securities); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a, 78c(16), 78d (2000)
(defining a security and setting forth the comprehensive remedies for statutory violations
of securities laws).
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This Note contends that TICs are securities under federal law because
investors depend upon the entrepreneurial and managerial efforts of the
TIC sponsor or third-parties for the profitability of their investments.
18
Part I of this Note introduces the federal securities laws, their underlying
principles, and the definition of the term "security." Part II explains why
TICs are securities rather than investments in real estate under existing
legal precedent. Part III proposes that the Supreme Court abolish the
bright line rules that defy the principles underlying the federal securities
laws by recognizing the flexible approach and liberal construction artic-
ulated in this Note. Finally, the conclusion provides a brief summary and
invites the SEC to offer new guidance in the TIC investment arena.
I. WHAT IS A SECURITY UNDER FEDERAL LAW?:
THE SECURITIES ACTS IN THE CONTEXT OF TIC TRANSACTIONS
In order to determine whether TICs constitute securities under federal
law, the inquiry necessarily starts with a historical introduction of the
securities laws and the underlying principles. 19 It is also necessary to
engage in a brief discussion of the definition of the term "security" 20 under
the relevant portions of the Securities Acts2 1 as applied by the United
States Supreme Court.
22
A. The Federal Securities Acts
Before Congress enacted the Securities Act of 1933, securities regula-
tion did not exist outside the regime of state "blue sky laws."2 3 "Blue sky
laws" are state-adopted statutes that regulate securities and require that
offerings comply with certain standards; if an offering fails to meet the
standards set forth by a State's blue sky laws, the securities cannot be sold
in that state.24 Congress enacted the 1933 and 1934 Acts in the aftermath
of the stock market crash of 1929 as remedial legislation designed to
18. See SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-300 (1946).
19. See generally Miranda, supra note 16, at 273-74 (discussing the principles
underlying Congress's decision to enact the securities laws).
20. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2006).
21. Id. § 77a, 78a (naming each of the Acts).
22. See Howey, 328 U.S. at 293 (defining the term "investment contract" under the
federal securities laws).
23. Miranda, supra note 16, at 273 (citing SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 246 U.S. 293,
298-99 (1946), and adopting the definition of "investment contract" as had been uniform-
ly applied by the state courts).
24. Id. at 273 & n.35.
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eliminate widespread abuses in a largely unregulated securities market. 25
The 1933 Act regulates the offer and sale of public offerings of securities
by requiring the disclosure of material information through a statement of
registration submitted to the SEC.26 The 1933 Act is basically a "coherent
and unified" statute aimed toward promoting disclosure and preventing
27fraud in the offer and sale of securities.
These Securities Acts also created the SEC to aid in the regulation of
the securities markets and the pursuit of violators. Although the SEC has
not issued a definitive ruling regarding whether TICs are securities, it has
issued guidance implicitly stating that TICs are securities. 29 This is sig-
nificant because the SEC has considerable expertise in interpreting both
the Securities Acts and the novel, complex investment schemes that fall
within the scope of federal statutory provisions. 30 Thus, considerable
25. Id. at 273 (citing United Hous. Found. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 849 (1975)). See
generally James M. Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28
GEo. WASH. L. REv. 29, 30 (1959) (explaining the history behind the securities laws).
26. Section 5 of the 1933 Act requires new issues of securities to be registered with
the SEC pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 77e. See also 15 U.S.C. § 77g (2006). See generally
JENNINGS ET AL., supra note 14, at 98 (exploring the boundaries of the registration
statement required under federal securities laws).
27. Miranda, supra note 16, at 275.
28. 15 U.S.C. § 78d (establishing a Securities and Exchange Commission).
29. On January 14, 2009, the SEC issued a response to a "no-action" request that
supports the view that TIC investments are securities versus real estate. The no-action re-
quest to the SEC was submitted in February 2006 and described two common TIC bus-
iness models being utilized by sponsors that were syndicating TIC offerings as real estate
and who were compensating real estate agents. The request asked the SEC to agree to
take "no action" if the companies were to syndicate offerings utilizing either the real
estate model or the securities model and were to compensate licensed real estate agents, a
practice prohibited for securities. Nearly three years later, the SEC issued its brief
response. Specifically, the SEC response stated that "based on the facts presented" the
SEC views the sale of undivided tenant-in-common interests as securities, per the
Securities Act of 1933. OMNI Brokerage, Inc. Argus Realty Investors, L.P. PASSCO
Companies, LLC, SEC No-Action Letter, 2009 WL 153818 (Jan. 14, 2009) [hereinafter
OMNI Brokerage No-Action Letter] (rejecting Triple Leases' claim that TIC's were not
securities). It should be emphasized, however, that the SEC response to the no-action
letter does not put an end to the securities versus real estate debate. The SEC response
was a concise letter that made it clear that their decision was based only on the facts
presented within the specific no-action request and may not be representative of other sit-
uations or the industry as a whole. Id.; see also infra note 292 and accompanying text.
30. Lewis D. Lowenfels & Alan R. Bromberg, What Is A Security Under Federal
Securities Laws?, 56 ALB. L. REV. 473, 477 (1993) (discussing Congress's intent to
define "security" broadly, to encompass any instruments).
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weight should be given to the fact that the SEC has implicitly stated that
TICs are securities.
3 1
B. Three General Principles Underlying the Federal Securities Acts
Three principles underlying the securities laws are gravely signify-
cant.32 First, Congress's purpose in enacting the securities laws was to
prevent those who offer and sell securities from exploiting investors.
3 3
Congress intended to carry out this goal by requiring that sponsors provide
investors with information that would be otherwise unavailable. 34 The
Supreme Court has consistently remarked that the Acts are designed to
protect investors through the promotion of full disclosure.3 5 With many
different types of securities, investors do not actively participate in the
venture and, therefore, do not have access to the kind of information that
registration under the Securities Acts would disclose.36 Yet much of the
information surrounding novel investment schemes, such as the potential
benefits of investing as weighed against the risk, is undoubtedly necessary
for a person to make informed investment decisions.3 7 Thus, the idea that
information is the best form of investor protection is paramount to the
purpose underlying the securities laws.
3 8
Second, courts should refrain from imposing formal limitations on
what constitutes a security and should instead apply flexible approaches
31. See generally Reuel E. Schiller, The Era of Deference: Courts Expertise, and the
Emergence of New Deal Administrative Law, 106 MICH. L. REv. 399 (2007) (citing
MORTON J. HORwrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960: THE
CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 222-25 (1992)) (discussing how courts' deference to
administrative agencies in administrative matters was a result of President Franklin D.
Roosevelt appointing federal judges to the bench).
32. See Miranda, supra note 16, at 274-75.
33. Id.; see also SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124-26 (1953).
34. See Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. at 124-26 (discussing three principles that have
recurred in the Supreme Court's definition of a "security").
35. Miranda, supra note 16, at 275-76 (stating that the prospectus and registration
statutes, which are required in the issuance in the new securities, are at the core of the
Securities Exchange Act (citing, among others, SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. of
Am., 359 U.S. 65, 76 (1959))).
36. See Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 30, at 477.
37. See SEC v. Life Partners, Inc., 87 F.3d 536, 552 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (Wald J.,
dissenting) (arguing that to control its concerns, Congress, when enacting the Security
Act, ensured that investors received adequate information before they commit their
money).
38. Id.
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and liberal construction. 39 Such an approach is necessary in order to ach-
ieve the remedial nature of the statutory purpose. 4° In determining whether
a particular arrangement or instrument constitutes a security, the Supreme
Court broadly interprets the 1933 and 1934 Acts to encompass "novel,
uncommon, or irregular devices, whatever they appear to be ...." 41 This
preservation of judicial flexibility is necessary "to ensure that those who
market investments are not able to avoid coverage of the Securities Acts
by creating new instruments that would not be covered by a more deter-
minable definition.
' 42
Third, the Supreme Court consistently reinforces the underlying policy
that "form (theory) should be disregarded for substance (reality), and that
emphasis should be on economic reality. 4 3 Accordingly, the "task has
fallen to the SEC and ultimately to the federal courts to decide which of
the myriad financial transactions in our society come within the coverage
of these statutes." 44 The congressional purpose in enacting the securities
laws was to regulate investments, regardless of the form and structure of
the instrument.45 Thus, the type of investment and its external form are
insignificant, and the securities laws should apply whenever it would be
appropriate for the protection of investors.
46
C. The Statutory Definition of a "Security"
To determine whether the offer and sale of TIC interests constitute the
offer and sale of a security or an investment in real estate, it is necessary to
start with the statutory definition of a "security" under the Securities
Acts.4 7 Courts routinely observe that the definition of a security is essenti-
ally the same under section 2(a)(1) of the 1933 Act48 and section 3(a)(10)
of the 1934 Act.49 Under the 1933 Act, a "security" includes "any note,
39. Miranda, supra note 16, at 277-78.
40. Id. at 305; see also Life Partners, Inc., 87 F.3d at 552-53 (Wald J., dissenting).
41. SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 351 (1943).
42. See Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 63 n.2 (1990); see also SEC v. Aqua-
Sonic Prods. Corp., 687 F.2d 577 (2d. Cir. 1982).
43. Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967).
44. United Hous. Found. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 848 (1975).
45. See Reves, 494 U.S. at 61.
46. See generally Miranda, supra note 16.
47. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a -77mm,78(c)(10) (2006).
48. Id. § 77b(a)(1).
49. Id. § 78c(a)(10); see Reves, 494 U.S. at 61 n.1 (following the Supreme Court's
ruling in United Housing Foundation and holding that the slightly different defin-itions
of the term "security" in the 1933 and 1934 Acts should be treated as essentially identical
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stock, treasury stock, security future, bond, debenture, evidence of indebt-
edness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agree-
ment, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscrip-
tion, transferable share, investment contract .... "50
Although neither TICs nor real property are specifically included in
the statutory list, this does not mean that TICs are not securities under the
Acts. 51 Recognizing the "virtually limitless scope of human ingenuity,"
Congress acted with vast authority52 when it enacted a definition of the
term security that is sufficient to include almost any device or scheme that
might be offered or sold as an investment. 53 Thus, Congress included
"investment contracts" in its definition of "securities" in order to encom-
pass complex and creative investment schemes.
54
The term "investment contract" is undefined by the Securities Act or
relevant legislative reports.55 The concept, however, was well-known in
many state blue sky laws that existed before the Securities Acts.56 Though
the term was also undefined by the state laws, it had "been broadly
construed by state courts so as to afford the investing public a full measure
of protection."57 By including "investment contracts" within the statutory
scope of the Securities Acts, Congress used a term well-defined in state
case law.58 The Supreme Court, therefore, thought it reasonable to attach
that meaning to the term, especially since that definition was consistent
with the spirit and statutory purpose of the Securities Acts.59 As a result, in
1946, the Supreme Court articulated the quintessential four-part test to
determine whether a certain device or scheme constitutes an investment
contract, and therefore a security, under the Securities Acts.
60
in meaning).
50. Id. § 77b(a)(1).
51. See Reves, 494 U.S. at 61 (holding that Congress provided a broad definition of
the term security so as to encompass "virtually any instruments that might be sold as an
investment").
52. Id. at 60-61.
53. Id. at 61.
54. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298 (1946).
55. See id.
56. See id.
57. Id. (citing People v. White, 12 P.2d 1078 (Cal. 1932); State v. Evans, 154 Minn.
95 (1922); Stevens v. Liberty Packing Corp., 111 NJ. Eq. 61 (1932); State v. Health, 199
N.C. 135 (1930); Klatt v. Guaranteed Bond Co., 213 Wis. 12 (1933); Prohaska v.
Hemmer-Miller Dev. Co., 256 Ill. App. 331 (1930)).
58. See Howey, 328 U.S. at 298-99.
59. See id.
60. See id. (establishing the leading test for investment contracts in the federal
system).
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D. Investment Contracts Under the Howey Test
In SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., the Supreme Court carefully considered the
general principles and congressional intent set forth above and articulated
a markedly broad definition of an investment contract. 61 Howey involved
the offer and sale of land sales contracts in the form of citrus grove acre-
62age, along with a service contract for harvesting. Although the service
contract was optional and investors were free to enter into service
agreements with any third-party, most of the investors opted for purchase
with the affiliate of the Howey Company.63 The service contract gave the
Howey Company a leasehold interest and covered cultivation of the
groves and other harvesting services. 64 Upon full payment of the purchase
price, each of the approximately forty purchasers of the citrus grove
became fractional owners of the citrus grove acreage. 65 The Howey Com-
pany did not register the interests as securities.
Consequently, the SEC brought an action to enjoin the sale of the
citrus grove interests. Because the interest at issue did not constitute any
of the specific, traditional kinds of securities enumerated in section 2(a)(1)
of the Securities Act of 1933, the SEC argued that the interests were
"investment contracts." 66 The Howey Court found that the arrangements
together constituted an "investment contract."
67
The Howey Court pointed out that the purchasers were investors with
general business experience, but no particular experience with citrus
crops. 68 They were lured into the investment not by the prospect of mere
undivided ownership in land, but rather by the prospects of a return on
their investment from the pooling of assets and sharing in the profits of the
69
enterprise. The Howey Court reasoned that because the inexperienced
investors resided in distant locales and were not interested in cultivating
the plots for themselves, they had to rely on the efforts of others to help
61. See generally id. at 293.
62. Id. at 295.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 296.
65. Id. at 295.
66. See id. at 297 (explaining the different positions on the legal issue taken by the
parties).
67. Id. at 300.
68. Id. at 296.
69. Id. at 300.
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them realize their profits. 70 Thus, fee ownership of packaged real estate
was treated as a security.
71
In reaching its conclusion, the Court adopted a four-part test to deter-
mine whether the arrangements constituted an investment contract.72
Under the adopted test, for purposes of the 1933 Act, an investment
contract is "a contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person (1) invests
his or her money, (2) in a common enterprise, and (3) is led to expect
profits, (4) solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party. ' '73 The
Howey Court did not adopt this test as a bright line rule.74 To the contrary,
the Howey test is a "flexible rather than a static principle, one that is cap-
able of adaptation to meet the countless and variable schemes devised by
those who seek the use of the money of others on the promise of profits.""
Although the plain language of the Howey decision, the underlying
principles of the Securities Acts, and the regulatory guidance espoused by
industry professionals 76 are all persuasive, TICs must be analyzed under
the Howey test in order to end the TIC turf war once and for all.
II. TICs ARE INVESTMENT CONTRACTS UNDER THE HOWEY TEST
AND ARE THEREFORE SECURITIES UNDER FEDERAL LAW
Over sixty years after the Supreme Court's decision in Howey, its
analysis test remains the leading test for investment contracts in the
federal system.77 The test remains flexible and continues to fulfill "the
statutory purpose of compelling full and fair disclosure relative to" the
70. Id.
71. See id.
72. Id. at 298-99.
73. Id.
74. See id.
75. Id. at 299.
76. On March 2, 2005, the National Association of Securities Brokers (NASD)
published Notice to Members 05-18, in an attempt to provide guidance concerning the
classification of TICs as an investment in real estate versus securities. The notice states
that TIC interests standing alone generally are not securities, but that when sponsors offer
and sell TICs together with other arrangements, such as management agreements, the
scheme generally would constitute an investment contract, and would therefore be
securities under federal law. The NASD takes the position that just because an investor in
a particular TIC transaction might have the power to terminate a management contract or
maintain and repair the property, it does not necessarily follow that a TIC interest is a
security. National Association of Securities Dealers, Notice to Members 05-18, Fin.
Indus. Regulatory Auth., Mar. 2005, http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/
@reg/@notice/documents/notices/p013455.pdf [hereinafter NASD, Notice to Members].
77. SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389, 390 (2004).
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issuance of the wide variety of unique investment mechanisms that "fall
within the ordinary concept of a security. '78 While some syndicated 79 real
estate investment schemes may fall outside the purview of the federal
securities laws, syndicated TICs do not.80 In general, in order to convince
those who continue to "bet the farm" by selling TICs as real estate that
TICs are in fact securities, there are two different TIC structures that must
be analyzed.8'
The first structure is known as the master lease, or affiliate TIC
structure. 82 Under this structure, the TIC investors purchase the property
subject to a long-term leaseback agreement with the sponsor or an affiliate
of the sponsor. The sponsor or its affiliate leases the whole property
from the TIC owners in exchange for an agreed upon amount of monthly
income or rent payable to the TIC owners. Under this master lease, the
sponsor or its affiliate is the only tenant.8 5 As the master lessee, the spon-
sor or its affiliate is ultimately responsible for all maintenance, leasing,
and management-related obligations that arise in the operation of syndic-
cated TIC investments. 86 The master lease TIC structure requires little or
no management on the part of the TIC owners. 87 Because those who invest
in an affiliated TIC depend on the undeniably significant entrepreneurial
and managerial efforts of the sponsor or its affiliate for the profitability of
their investment, players on both sides of the turf war generally agree that
88this structure is inherently a security.
78. Howey, 428 U.S. at 299.
79. See Alex R. Pederson, The Rejuvenation of the Tenancy-In-Common Form for
Like-Kind Exchanges and Its Impact on Lenders, 24 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 467,
473 (2005) (explaining that syndication is "the elegant term for group participation in the
ownership or development of an idea, product or tangible asset").
80. See, e.g., Snyder, supra note 13; Darryl Steinhause, You Can Take the Security
Out of TIC but You Can't Take the TIC Out of Security, TIC TALK, 1st Quarter 2007,
available at http://www. 1031 propertywatch.com/articles/shArt.pdf.
81. See generally Elizabeth Ayres Whitman, A "TIC"ing Time Bomb: Rule 506
Meets Section 1031, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 121, 128 (2007).
82. See, e.g., Richard M. Lipton, DSTs and § 1031: A Marriage Made in Heaven, or
Just a Pipe Dream?, 646 PRAc. L. INST/TAX 911, 931 (2005).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. What is a Master Lease, http://www.tenantincommon1031.com/master-lease.php
(last visited Mar. 13, 2010).
86. Id.
87. Id.; see also Richard Lipton, TICs as Real Estate (and not Securities), TIC TALK,
4th Quarter 2006, available at http://www.omnil031corp.com/tictalk/ticTalk Archive/tic
Talk4Qtr06.pdf.
88. See, e.g., Lipton, supra note 87; Steinhause, supra note 80.
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The second structure is known as the property management, or non-
affiliate structure.89 This structure is commonly characterized as a syndic-
cated TIC transaction coupled with a property management agreement,
where the property management is not carried out by the sponsor or an
affiliate of the sponsor.90 Thus, instead of buying the fractionalized inter-
ests subject to a leaseback agreement with the sponsor or an affiliate of the
sponsor, the TIC investors rely on third-party property and asset managers
to operate the investment. 91 Because players on both sides of the debate
generally agree that the master lease TIC structure constitutes a security
under federal law, the analysis below will focus on the reasons why non-
affiliate TICs satisfy the four-pronged Howey test.
92
A. TICs Satisfy All Four Prongs of the Howey Test
To this point, it is generally agreed upon that all syndicated TICs
easily satisfy the first three prongs of the Howey test.9 3 The industry de-
bate is largely confined to the fourth prong.94 As a result, the analysis be-
low briefly shows why syndicated TIC investments satisfy the first three
prongs of the Howey test, but it focuses primarily on the reasons why "the
efforts of others" 95 under the fourth prong of the Howey test are sufficient
to bring TICs within the purview of federal securities laws.
96
1. Investment of Money
The first prong of the Howey test, an investment of money, is rarely an
issue when the courts attempt to identify investment contracts. 97 Courts
apply a broad interpretation to this prong and have not limited it to cash.98
In every decision made by the Supreme Court that recognizes the presence
of an investment contract under the Securities Acts, the person found to
have been an investor voluntarily chose to give up specific consideration
89. See Thorup, supra note 8, at 426 (analyzing the property management style TIC
structure under the Howey test).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See Lipton, supra note 87 (conceding that master-lease TICs are securities).
93. See, e.g., id.; Steinhause, supra note 80.
94. Snyder, supra note 13.
95. See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a, 78a.
96. Id.
97. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293,298-99 (1946).
98. See, e.g., Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 559-60 (1979).
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in return for a separable financial interest.99 In TIC transactions, the
investors, even those acting in connection with like-kind exchanges,
°0
purchase their TIC interests in exchange for cash or other consideration.
1
Thus, the tangible consideration in the form of cash or like-kind credit
given by TIC investors in exchange for their interests satisfies the first
prong of the Howey test.
2. Common Enterprise
The second prong of the Howey test requires the existence of a com-
mon enterprise. 10 2 There is currently a split among the circuits as to the
requirements of the second prong of the Howey test. 10 3 This split gives rise
to two different versions of commonality: horizontal and vertical. Most
circuits that have considered the issue find that the common enterprise
requirement is satisfied through horizontal commonality. Horizontal com-
monality requires a pooling of interests of two or more investors who
share the investment risks and benefits of the venture with one another.
104
On the other hand, the Fifth,10 5 Ninth,10 6 and Eleventh Circuits 10 7 have
99. Id. at 559; see, e.g., Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967) (money paid
for bank capital stock); SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. of Am., 359 U.S. 65, 76
(1959) (premium paid for variable-annuity contract); Howey, 328 U.S. at 293 (money
paid for purchase, maintenance, and harvesting of orange grove); SEC v. C. M. Joiner
Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 345-46 (1943) (money paid for land and oil exploration).
100. See I.R.C. § 1031(a)(1) (2000) (establishing that under special circumstances, a
taxpayer can defer tax liability that would otherwise be imposed as a result of the capital
gains from real property).
101. See Thorup, supra note 8.
102. Howey, 328 U.S. at 298-99.
103. See, e.g., Shawn Hill Crook, Comment, Wat is a Common Enterprise? Horiz-
ontal and Vertical Commonality in an Investment Contract Analysis, 19 CUMB. L. REV.
323 (1989).
104. See, e.g., SEC v. Infinity Group Co., 212 F.3d 180, 188 (3d Cir. 2000); SEC v.
Banner Fund Int'l, 211 F.3d 602, 614-15 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Teague v. Bakker, 35 F.3d
978, 986 n.8 (4th Cir. 1994); Wals v. Fox Hills Dev. Corp., 24 F.3d 1016, 1018-19 (7th
Cir. 1994); Revak v. SEC Realty, 18 F.3d 81, 87-89 (2d Cir. 1994); Newmyer v.
Philatelic Leasing, Ltd., 888 F.2d 385, 391-93 (6th Cir. 1989) (applying horizontal com-
monality as the requirement that investors share or pool their funds in order to succeed in
the venture).
105. See, e.g., SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 478-79 (5th Cir.
1974).
106. See, e.g., SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enter., Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 481-82 (9th Cir.
1973).
107. See, e.g., SEC v. ETS Payphones, Inc., 300 F.3d 1281, 1283-84 (11th Cir. 2002)
(recognizing "horizontal commonality" as the majority test in the circuit courts, but
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adopted some 108 version of vertical commonality. Vertical commonality
requires the fortunes of the investor to be "interwoven with and dependent
on the efforts and success of those seeking the investment or of third
parties.' ' 109 Vertical commonality focuses on the relationship between the
investors and the promoter, not on the relationship between the individual
investors.1 10 While it is not clear whether the Supreme Court believes hori-
zontal or vertical commonality should control the analysis for the second
prong of Howey, 111 this does not present an issue because TICs satisfy
both interpretations.
In the typical TIC transaction, at least two investors purchase undivi-
ded interests and share in common ownership of the property on a pro-rata
basis in accordance with the percent interest held by each respective
investor. 112 TIC investors pool their assets and share in the venture's
profits and losses on a pro rata basis. 1 13 The sharing of the risks and
benefits of the investment, as well as the pooling of assets, constitutes
horizontal commonality for the purposes of the Howey test. 114
TIC transactions also satisfy vertical commonality. 115 In the typical
non-affiliate TIC transaction, the sponsor or managing third party does not
gain profits or suffer losses independent of action exercised by invest-
ors. Thus, investor fortunes and profits are adequately interwoven with,
and dependent on the efforts of the sponsor and third parties to the extent
necessary to satisfy vertical commonality.'
1 17
applying precedent that broad vertical commonality is the controlling test in the Eleventh
Circuit), rev'd. on unrelated grounds by SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389, 393-97 (2004).
108. Within the circuits that have adopted vertical commonality under the second
prong of the Howey test, two variations exist: (1) narrow vertical commonality and (2)
broad vertical commonality. Compare Mordaunt v. Incomco, 686 F.2d 815 (9th Cir.
1992), with Long v. Shultz Cattle Co., 881 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1989).
109. Villeneuve v. Advanced Bus. Concepts Corp., 698 F.2d 1121, 1124 (1lth Cir.
1983).
110. See SEC v. Unique Fin. Concepts, Inc., 196 F.3d 1195, 1199-1200 (11th Cir.
1999).
111. The Supreme Court has never decided which form of commonality is required.
See McGill v. Am. Land & Exploration Co., 776 F.2d 923,925 (10th Cir. 1985).
112. See Marilyn B. Cane & Jennifer C. Erdelyi, 1031 Tenant In Common Exchanges:
A "TIC"king Time Bomb at the Intersection of Real Estate, Securities, and Tax Law?, 14
U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 273, 283-85 (2006).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See Long v. Shultz Cattle Co., 881 F.2d 129, 140-41 (5th Cir. 1989); Jonathan E.
Shook, Note, The Common Enterprise Test: Getting Horizontal or Going Vertical in
Wals v. Fox Hills Development Corp., 30 TULSA L.J. 727, 728-34 (1995).
116. See Cane & Erdelyi, supra note 112.
117. Id.
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3. Expectation of Profits
The third prong of the Howey test requires an "expectation of
profits."" 8 For the purposes of Howey, the term "profits" means merely a
financial return on an investment.119 In its 2004 decision in SEC v.
Edwards, the Supreme Court re-articulated this position. 12° The Court
emphasized that when it held that "profits" must "come solely from the
efforts of others," it was "speaking of the profits that investors seek on
their investment." z The Court used "profits" in the "sense of income or
return, to include, for example, dividends, other periodic payments, or the
increased value of the investment.' 22 In addition, the enticement of tax
deferral may also constitute profits under the third prong of Howey.123
In the typical non-affiliate transaction, investors purchase TICs with
the expectation that the property will not only produce monthly income
through rentals and leasing, but that the value of the property will apprec-
iate. Additionally, many investors purchase TICs in order to defer taxes
through 1031 exchanges. 25 Thus, TIC investors have an expectation of
profits for the purposes of the Howey test.
126
4. Reliance on the Efforts of Others
The fourth prong of the Howey test requires that the expectation of
profits come "solely from the efforts of [others]. 127 While the Supreme
Court used the word "solely" in its articulation of the fourth prong of
Howey test, the lower courts have essentially disregarded the word
"solely," instead requiring that the third-party efforts be "undeniably
significant ones, those essential managerial efforts which affect the failure
or success of the enterprise."' 128 The Ninth Circuit's interpretation has been
118. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946).
119. United Hous. Found. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 853 (1975).
120. SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389, 393-97 (2004).
121. Id. at 394.
122. Id.
123. Long v. Shultz Cattle Co., 881 F.2d 129, 132-34 (5th Cir. 1989).
124. See Cane & Erdelyi, supra note 112, at 283-84.
125. 26 U.S.C. § 1031 (2000); see also Bradford Updike, Exploring the Frontier of
Non-Traditional Real Estate Investments: A Closer Look at 1031 Tenancy-In-Common
Arrangements, 40 CREIGHTON L. REv. 271 (2007).
126. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946).
127. Id.
128. SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enter., Inc., 474 F.2d. 476, 482 (9th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973).
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adopted by ten additional circuits. 129 Additionally, while the Supreme
Court has not espoused a position on the issue, it expressly recognized the
Ninth Circuit's liberal view.130 Moreover, the Supreme Court altogether
omitted the word "solely" in its most recent formulation of the Howey
test. 131 In SEC v. Edwards, the Supreme Court quoted the investment
contract definition from Howey and restated the four-part test as "an inve-
stment in a common venture premised on a reasonable expectation of
profits to be derived from the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of
others.' ' 132 Thus, in determining whether non-affiliate TICs are securities,
the language of Howey should not be applied literally. 1
33
In addition, the "efforts of others," as described in the fourth prong
should be broken down into two categories when analyzing TIC transact-
ions: pre-purchase and post-purchase. 134 Pre-purchase efforts are defined
as those carried out by the TIC sponsor prior to the close of the
investment.1 35 Post-purchase efforts are those carried out by the third-party
property and asset managers after the close of the investment. 136 In order
to determine whether TICs are securities, it is necessary to consider the
pre-purchase and post-purchase circumstances that exist in the typical
non-affiliate TIC transaction.
1 37
129. See, e.g., SEC v. Unique Fin. Concepts, Inc., 196 F.3d 1195, 1201 (lth Cir.
1999) (adopting the Ninth Circuit's liberal interpretation of the word "solely" as used in
the Howey test); SEC v. Int'l Loan Network, Inc., 968 F.2d 1304, 1308 (D.C. Cir. 1992);
Rivanna Trawlers Unlimited v. Thompson Trawlers, Inc., 840 F.2d 236, 240 n.4 (4th Cir.
1988); Goodwin v. Elkins & Co., 730 F.2d 99, 103 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
831 (1984); SEC v. Prof. Assocs., 731 F.2d 349, 357 (6th Cir. 1984); Kim v. Cochenour,
687 F.2d 210, 213 n.7 (7th Cir. 1982); SEC v. Aqua-Sonic Prods. Corp., 687 F.2d 577,
582 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1086, (1982); Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d
404, 418 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981); Aldrich v. McCulloch Prop.,
Inc., 627 F.2d 1036, 1040 n. 3 (10th Cir. 1980); Fargo Partners v. Dan Corp., 540 F.2d
912, 914-15 (8th Cir. 1976).
130. United Hous. Found. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 n.16 (1975).
131. See SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389, 395 (2004).
132. Id. at 395 (citing United Housing Foundation, 421 U.S. at 852).
133. While the Supreme Court has not expressly stated whether the language from
Howey is to be interpreted literally, the majority of courts have taken the position that if
the Supreme Court was faced with the question, it would not insist on applying the word
"solely" literally. Aqua-Sonic, 687 F.2d at 582.
134. See SEC v. Mut. Benefits Corp., 408 F.3d 737 (1 1th Cir. 2005); SEC v. Life
Partners, Inc., 87 F.3d 536 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
135. Mutual Benefits Corp., 408 F.3d at 743-44.
136. See generally Miranda, supra note 16.
137. Brian Coner Levin, Note, Killing Life Partners: Why Viatical Settlements Are
"Securities" in Light of SEC v. Mutual Benefits Corporation and Other Recent Cases
That Explicitly Reject SEC v. Life Partners, 6 J. Bus. & SEC. L. 71 (2006) (discussing the
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a. Pre-Purchase Efforts
The Supreme Court has only dealt with investment contracts in a
piecemeal fashion and has not offered clear guidance concerning the effect
of a sponsor's pre-purchase efforts on the fourth prong of the Howey
test. 138 To fill the gap, the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals have come to
surprisingly different conclusions.
139
i. A Bright Line Distinction: SEC v. Life Partners, Inc.
Those who argue that TICs can be offered and sold as real estate rely
on a controversial and widely-criticized decision by the D.C. Circuit
which stands for the proposition that a sponsor's pre-purchase efforts are
insignificant and, therefore, cannot satisfy the fourth prong of Howey.1
40
In SEC v. Life Partners, Inc., the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals considered
whether fractionalized ownership interests in viatical settlements were
investment contracts under the Howey test. 14 As is the case with the
analysis of TICs, the court's decision in Life Partners hinged on the fourth
prong of Howey. 142 The SEC argued that although the defendant sponsor,
Life-Partners, Inc. (LPI), did not perform substantial post-purchase efforts,
the court could nonetheless find that the viatical settlements at issue were
investment contracts based on the pre-purchase efforts carried out by
LPI. 143 The court, however, did not agree with the SEC's position that the
time of sale is an artificial dividing line. 144 Rather, the court interpreted
the dividing line as a significant legal construction that should be recog-
distinction between pre-purchase and post-purchase efforts).
138. The Supreme Court has rarely considered investment contracts since espousing
the Howey test in 1946. See, e.g., SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389, 389 (2004); Reves v.
Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 56 (1990); Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681,
684 (1985); Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 552 (1982); Daniel v. Int'l Bhd. of
Teamsters, 439 U.S. 551, 552 (1979); United Hous. Found. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 845
(1975); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967); SEC v. Variable Annuity Life
Ins. Co. of Am., 359 U.S. 65, 76 (1959) (analyzing investment contracts under the Howey
test).
139. Compare Life Partners, Inc., 87 F.3d 536, with Mutual Benefits Corp., 408 F.3d
737 (declining to follow the bright line rule espoused in Life Partners). Compare
Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1981), with SEC v. Aqua-Sonic Prods.
Corp., 687 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1982).
140. See, e.g., Levin, supra note 137.
141. Life Partners, Inc., 87 F.3d at 538.
142. Id. at 545-49.
143. See id. at 546-49.
144. Id. at 547.
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nized by the courts when analyzing a particular instrument under the
fourth prong of Howey.1
45
In rationalizing its unprecedented conclusion, the Life Partners court
reasoned that if the investor's profits depend primarily upon the pro-
moter's efforts after closing, then the investor may benefit from the
disclosure and other requirements of the federal securities laws.146 On the
other hand, however, the court stated that (1) if the value of the sponsor's
efforts had already been factored into the promotional fees or the purchase
price of the investment, and (2) if neither the sponsor nor any other third-
party was expected to make additional efforts that would have had an
impact on the failure or success of the enterprise, then the need for invest-
or protection under the Securities Acts is cognizably reduced. 147 Thus,
according to Life Partners, absent substantial post-purchase efforts under-
taken by the sponsor or a third-party, the fourth prong of Howey cannot be
satisfied. 148
ii. A Flexible Approach: SEC v. Mutual Benefits Corp.
Conversely, in SEC v. Mutual Benefits Corp., the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals declined to follow the Life Partners decision and reject-
ed the pre-post bright-line distinction. 149 Like Life Partners, Mutual Bene-
fits Corp. addressed whether fractionalized ownership interest in viatical
settlements were investment contracts under the Howey test. The decision
in Mutual Benefits Corp. also hinged on the fourth prong of Howey. 150 The
defendant, Mutual Benefits Corp. (MBC), relied on the Life Partners
bright line rule for the proposition that its pre-purchase efforts could not
bring the viatical settlements within the purview of the federal securities
laws. 15 1 The court found both MBC's argument and the Life Partners
rationale unpersuasive.1
52
In reaching the conclusion that the fourth prong of Howey is not con-
fined to a "forward-looking inquiry" from the point of closing, the court
found that while it may be true that the "efforts of others" prong of the
145. Id.
146. See Levin, supra note 137.
147. Id. (citing Life Partners, Inc., 87 F.3d at 547).
148. Life Partners, Inc., 87 F.3d at 546-48.
149. SEC v. Mut. Benefits Corp., 408 F.3d 737, 743 (1 1th Cir. 2005); see also Levin,
supra note 137.
150. Mutual Benefits Corp., 408 F.3d at 737, 743.
151. Id. at 741.
152. Id. at 744-45.
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Howey test is more easily satisfied by post-purchase efforts of the sponsor
or third-parties, there is no statutory or judicial authority upon which to
exclude pre-purchase entrepreneurial or managerial activities from the
analysis. 53 Thus, according to Mutual Benefits Corp., the fourth prong of
Howey can be satisfied even in the absence of substantial post-purchase
activities undertaken by the sponsor or a third-party.
54
iii. The Pre-Purchase Efforts Performed by TIC Sponsors Are
Significant and Should Not Be Excluded from the Analysis
While it is true that the securities laws "are not a broad federal remedy
for all fraud,"' 55 the Supreme Court has never formally distinguished pre-
purchase from post-purchase efforts under the fourth prong of Howey.
156
Until Life Partners, no federal case ever held that pre-purchase efforts
cannot satisfy the fourth prong of Howey. 157 Although this Note does not
contend that Life Partners was incorrectly decided, it does contend that the
bright-line rule announced in Life Partners is neither in line with the
general principles underlying the securities laws, nor appropriate for an
analysis of TIC transactions. 158 Thus, keeping in mind the need for a fact-
sensitive inquiry and case-by-case analysis, courts should recognize that
the flexible approach and liberal construction as applied in Mutual
Benefits Corp. is the proper approach for TIC transactions. 159 The Sup-
reme Court recently reinforced the position that it would not interpret the
securities laws in such a way as to undermine the statutory purpose and
principles. 6 The threshold question for any inquiry under the fourth
prong of Howey is not "when" the efforts of "others" take place, but
whether those efforts are so undeniably significant that the investor relies
upon them for the success of the investment. 161
The dying breed of sponsors that market TIC investments as interests
in real estate, rather than securities, attempt to minimize the importance of
their role by characterizing the efforts they undertake as insignificant in
153. Id. at 743-44.
154. Id.
155. SEC v. Life Partners, Inc., 87 F.3d 536, 547 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
156. See Miranda, supra note 16, at 272 (citing Life Partners, Inc., 87 F.3d at 553
(Wald J., dissenting)).
157. Id.
158. Levin, supra note 137; see also Snyder, supra note 13.
159. Mutual Benefits Corp., 408 F.3d at 743-44.
160. SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389, 393 (2004).
161. Id.
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the context of the investment.162 However, when considering the flexible
approach and liberal construction underlying the Securities Acts, as well
as the emphasis that courts place on economic reality, these arguments are
without merit.163 The position that the pre-purchase efforts carried out by
TIC sponsors are insignificant for the purposes of the fourth prong of
Howey begs this question: If pre-purchase efforts are so insignificant then
why do TIC sponsors charge millions of dollars in sponsor fees for their
services? 164
TIC sponsors perform substantial pre-purchase efforts prior to the
acquisition of the TIC property and the sale of TIC interests to invest-
165ors. The sponsor initially makes all of the important decisions with
respect to the acquisition of the property. 16 6 Typically, the process begins
when the sponsor carefully selects the property to be purchased., 67 After
selecting properties that fall within the selected criteria, the sponsor per-
forms due diligence, as well as a more general economic investigation of
the market area.168 TIC sponsors then identify potential investors and arr-
ange favorable financing and insurance for the TIC property. 69 As part of
this process, TIC sponsors seek tax-related and legal advice, as well as
perform substantial services, such as lender selection and loan negotia-
tion.1 70 TIC sponsors also prepare marketing materials and documents,
which include descriptions of the property and financial projections for the
potential life of the TIC investment. 1 7 The sponsor also provides other
significant agreements, such as leases and tenant-in-common agreements
which govern the TIC owners' operation of the investment. 72 Finally, TIC
sponsors generally choose the initial property manager to maintain ther 73 mr
property throughout the transition process. TIC sellers charge more than
substantial fees in return for their organizational, marketing, and transact-
162. See, e.g., Thorup, supra note 8, at 422-24 (arguing that the efforts undertaken by
TIC sponsors are incidental to the commercial real estate industry and do not affect the
fourth prong of Howey).
163. See Steinhause, supra note 80.
164. See Snyder, supra note 13.
165. See Steinhause, supra note 80.
166. See Snyder, supra note 13.
167. See Thorup, supra note 8, at 426.
168. Whitman, supra note 81, at 128-29.
169. Id.; see also Steinhause, supra note 80.
170. See, e.g., Berkeley, supra note 10, at 736; Whitman, supra note 81, at 128-29.
171. See Thorup, supra note 8, at 428.
172. See id. at 430.
173. See id. at 429; see also Steinhause, supra note 80.
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ional efforts, which are of the utmost importance to the success of the
investment. 174
In order to satisfy the fourth prong of Howey, or at the very least play a
significant role in the determination, the sponsor's pre-purchase efforts
must significantly impact the profits sought in the return on the invest-
ment.17 From the very beginning through closing, all of the activities
undertaken by TIC sponsors are the type of efforts that affect the "failure
or success of the enterprise."' 176 Finding the property and negotiating the
purchase price pla v' an important role in the short- and long-term success
of the investment. For instance, overpaying for the property, or choos-
ing a property located in a poor or unreliable market, can seriously hinder
investor profits that flow from the investment. 178 In addition, the terms
negotiated by the sponsor on behalf of the TIC owners and the decision
surrounding the amount of debt that should be placed on the property
directly impact both cash flow and the stability of the investment. 179 This
is not to say that every pre-packaged commercial real estate deal is a
security. 180 The requirement that the other three elements of the Howey
test must also be met precludes any support for such a conclusion.
18 1
Looking at the pre-closing process in its entirety shows that TIC
sponsors often organize and supervise a geographically diverse group of
unrelated and inexperienced investors from step one through closing.
These efforts have a crucial impact on the failure or success of the enter-
prise. 182 While courts must remember the need for flexibility in identifying
those who need protection under the securities laws,1 83 courts should find
174. See, e.g., Thorup, supra note 8, at 426; Whitman, supra note 81, at 128-29.
175. SEC v. Howey, 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1945); SEC v. Mut. Benefits Corp., 408
F.3d 737, 743-44 (1 1th Cir. 2005).
176. See Steinhause, supra note 80; see also Snyder, supra note 13.
177. Snyder, supra note 13.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. See Thorup, supra note 8.
181. SEC v. Howey, 328 U.S. 293,298-99 (1945).
182. See, e.g., SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enter., Inc., 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1973).
183. Any offer and sale of a security must either be registered or exempt from
registration under applicable state and federal securities laws. One of the most common
exemptions is the non-public or limited offering exemption. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-
230.508 (2008). In SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., the Supreme Court established that the
non-public offering exemption will be available in offerings made exclusively to invest-
ors who are able to "fend for themselves." 346 U.S. 119, 124-26 (1953). In the eyes of
the Ralston Court, certain investors, such as experienced and wealthy individuals or
investors with a prior business relationship with the sponsor, do not need the protections
afforded by full registration under the securities laws. Id.
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that the pre-purchase efforts of TIC sponsors can alone satisfy the fourth
prong of Howey. 184 At the very least, when combined with the insubstan-
tial and illusory investor control that exists after closing, these pre-
purchase efforts are sufficient to bring TICs within coverage of the federal
securities laws.'
85
b. Post-Purchase Efforts
In determining whether TIC investors have a reasonable expectation of
profits to be derived from the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of
others, the post-closing inquiry is largely confined to the degree of actual
control given to and exercised by TIC owners, versus the degree to which
this purported control is insubstantial and illusory. 186 Those who argue
that TICs can be structured as real estate rely on another line of cases and
bright line rules that are collectively referred to as the "written agree-
ments" test.' 87 Under this test, the actual control exercised by the TIC
owner after closing is irrelevant-as long as the investor has the right to
control the purchased asset, the fourth prong of Howey is not satisfied.' 88
i. A Pre-Cursor to the Written Agreements Test: Williamson v.
Tucker
In Williamson v. Tucker,189 the Fifth Circuit determined whether
general partnership interests in a real estate development scheme were
securities. 19° The Williamson court began with the presumption that gen-
eral partnerships are not securities, stating that investor-plaintiffs will
"have a difficult factual burden if they are to establish that the [general
partnership] interests they purchased are securities."' 9' In dictum, the
court applied a three-part test to determine whether a general partnership
interest that on its face creates a true partnership is a security. 192Under the
184. Howey, 328 U.S. at 298.
185. See, e.g., SEC v. Mut. Benefits Corp., 408 F.3d 737, 743-45 (llth Cir. 2005).
186. Albanese v. Fla. Nat'l Bank of Orlando, 823 F.2d 408, 410 (1 1th Cir. 1987);
Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 419-24 (5th Cir. 1981).
187. See, e.g., Albanese, 823 F.2d at 410.
188. Gordon v. Terry, 684 F.2d 736, 741-42 (11th Cir. 1982) (adopting Williamson
and holding that if the investor retains the ability to control the profitability of his invest-
ment, the agreement is not a security).
189. 645 F.2d at 404.
190. Id. at 406-07.
191. Id. at 416.
192. Id. at 424.
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test, a general partnership or joint venture interest can be designated a
security if: (1) the agreement among the parties leaves so little power in
the hands of the partner that the arrangement-in-fact distributes power as
would a limited partnership; or (2) the partner is so inexperienced and
unknowledgeable in business affairs that he or she is incapable of intelli-
gently exercising his or her partnership powers; or (3) the partner is so
dependent on some unique entrepreneurial or managerial ability of the
promoter or manager that he or she cannot replace the manager of the
enterprise or otherwise exercise meaningful partnership powers.' 93 The
first prong of Williamson is the main focus of the analysis and has widely
become known as the written agreements test. 194 Under this test, the
Williamson court declared that "[iln each case the actual control exercised
by the purchaser is irrelevant."' 195 As long as the investor "has the right to
control the asset he has purchased, he is not dependent on the promoter or
on a third party for 'those essential managerial efforts which affect the
failure or success of the enterprise."'
196
ii. The Bright Line Written Agreements Test: Albanese v.
Florida National Bank of Orlando
The written agreements test has been re-articulated and embraced in
other Federal Circuit Courts of Appeal as well. 197 For instance, in Alban-
ese v. Florida National Bank of Orlando,9 8 the Eleventh Circuit examined
claims from plaintiffs-investors that invested capital in an ice machine
193. Id.; see also Matek v. Murat, 862 F.2d 720, 729 (9th Cir. 1988) (declining to
adopt Williamson with respect to the second and third prongs due to a finding that the
second two prongs of Williamson create uncertainty in the area of business investing).
Williamson did not hold that the partnership interests were securities; rather the appellate
court reviewed the lower court's dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction as a
dismissal based on the pleadings. Williamson, 645 F.2d at 406-07. The court was thus
compelled to apply the strict standard of Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682-83 (1946), to
the lower court's decision. Id. at 415-17.
194. See, e.g., SEC v. Aqua-Sonic Prods. Corp., 687 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 452 U.S. 1086 (1982) (citing Williamson, 645 F.2d at 418-19).
195. Williamson, 645 F.2d at 421.
196. Id.
197. See, e.g., SEC v. Merchant Capital, LLC, 483 F.3d 747, 756 (11th Cir. 2007)
(stating that in Williamson, the Eleventh Circuit defines the conditions under which a
general partnership interest may qualify as an investment contract, as well as the scope of
the investment contract analysis); Albanese v. Fla. Nat'l Bank of Orlando, 823 F.2d 408,
410 (11 th Cir. 1987); Fargo Partners v. Dain Corp., 540 F.2d 912, 914-15 (8th Cir. 1976).
198. Albanese, 823 F.2d at 409-10.
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leaseback program. 199 The sponsor in Albanese agreed to place the ice
machine in various hotels and motels and contracted to service and collect
money from the machines. 200 In concluding that profits were derived
solely from the efforts of the corporation and, therefore, the fourth prong
of Howey was satisfied, the court stated that "the crucial inquiry [for the
fourth prong] is the amount of control that the investors retain under their
written agreements." 201 The Albanese court reasoned that if the investor
retains the ability to control the profitability of his or her investment
through power expressly articulated in the written agreements, then the
purchaser is not dependent on the sponsor or a third-party for the
"undeniably significant efforts" that affect the "failure or success of the
enterprise and the fourth prong of the Howey test is not satisfied. 20 2
iii. The Target Audience Approach: SEC v. Aqua-Sonic
Products Corp. and United States v. Leonard
In SEC v. Aqua-Sonic Products Corp., 203 the Second Circuit consid-
ered an SEC enforcement action brought under the federal securities laws
where the sponsor offered licenses to sell dental products, while an
affiliate of the sponsor was described to potential investor-licensees as an
optional sales agent.20 4 Under that optional agreement, the investor retain-
ed the right to terminate it at any time upon 90 days written notice and
also retained ultimate control over pricing and other conditions relating to
the offer and sale of the dental products, including the right to sell the
dental products within the specified territory himself.20 5 The court ultimat-
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 410 (citing Williamson, 645 F.2d at 423-24).
202. Id. (citing Gordon v. Terry, 684 F.2d 736 (1 1th Cir. 1982)). SEC v. Merchant
Capital is the most recent Eleventh circuit case to consider the written agreements test.
483 F.3d 747 (l1th Cir. 2007). In that case, the Eleventh Circuit found that interests
owned by registered limited liability partnerships (RLLPs) were "investment contracts"
covered by the federal securities laws. Id. at 765-66. When considering the fourth prong
of Howey, the court found that the partners had the powers of limited partners because
they had no authority to remove the managing general partner (MGP) and the purported
authority to approve purchases was illusory. Id. at 763-65. The court further found that
(1) the partners were inexperienced in the debt purchasing industry, and (2) even if they
could have removed the MGP, they had no realistic alternative as manager, because their
debt pools were in fractional form with a company whose only contractual relationship
was with the MGP. Id. at 764.
203. SEC v. Aqua-Sonic Prods. Corp., 687 F.2d 577 (2d. Cir. 1982).
204. Id. at 577-78.
205. Id. at 579-80.
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ely held that the arrangements were investment contracts and therefore
securities.
206
The lynchpin of the Second Circuit's approach is the "target" audi-
ence, rather than the amount of investor control provided in the written
agreements governing the investment.2 °7 The Second Circuit emphasized
that the Howey Court did not focus on whether it was somehow possible
for an investor to profit without the efforts of others, or whether the
208investor had a theoretical right to reject the efforts of others. Rather, the
Howey Court focused on whether the typical investor who was being
solicited would be expected under all the circumstances to accept the
efforts of others and be passive, or reject the efforts of others and be
active.20
9
Like the Howey Court, the Aqua-Sonic court properly focused its
inquiry when it stated that the sponsors "sought to attract the passive
investor for whose benefit the securities laws were enacted., 210 The court
further stated that the fact that an investor might retain "some legal rights
over distribution does not render it unnecessary for him to have the
benefits of the disclosures provided in registration statements or the pro-
tection of the antifraud provisions."211 The Court explained that "[i]f, by
contrast, the reasonable expectation was one of significant investor
control, a reasonable purchaser could be expected to make his own
investigation of the new business he planned to undertake and the
protection of the 1933 and 1934 Acts would be unnecessary.,
212
More recently, in United States v. Leonard, a Second Circuit case
relying on Aqua-Sonic Products Corp., "criminal charges were brought
against twenty-five individuals involved in the marketing of investment
interests in two limited liability companies." 213 The defendants argued that
disclosure was not mandatory because the LLC interests were not secur-
214ities. The Leonard court revisited the target audience approach from
Aqua-Sonic Products Corp. and upheld a jury finding that membership
interests in the LLCs constituted "investment contracts," because defen-
dants sought out passive investors who did not actively participate in the
206. Id. at 585.
207. Id. at 582-85.
208. Id. at 582-83.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 585.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. United States v. Leonard, 529 F.3d 83 (2d. Cir. 2008).
214. Id. at 85.
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venture. 2" Although the LLC's organizational documents gave significant
managerial authority to members, little such authority was exercised in
practice. Therefore, "the jury could reasonably have found the managerial
rights contained in the organizational documents were hollow and
illusory. 216
In reaching its conclusion, the Leonard court silently acknowledged
the written agreements rationale and rejected such a limited inquiry when
it reasoned that if the court confined itself to "a review of the organiz-
ational documents," it would "likely conclude that the interests ... could
not constitute securities because the documents would lead us to believe
that members were expected to play an active role in the management of
the companies. 2 17 Thus, rather than confining the inquiry to the
theoretical authority given to investors in the written agreements, Leonard
recognized the importance of "the factual circumstances" and the written
agreements, as well as the actual exercise of control surrounding the
investment. 18
iv. Applying the Written Agreements Test to TICs Would
Circumvent Statutory Purpose
Although numerous courts embrace the written agreements test under
Albanese2 19 and the general partnership approach espoused by the Will-
iamson court, 22 the target audience approach applied by the Second
Circuit in Aqua-Sonic and Leonard is a more realistic analysis for TICs
and is designed to benefit the investor, not the sponsor.221 While the
215. Id. at 88-89; see Darryl Steinhause, TICs As Real Estate: Another Nail In The
Coffin, TIC TALK, 3rd Quarter 2008, available at http://www.vojodesign.com/websites/
omniCR/2008Qtr3/articleO4.html (discussing the Second Circuit's decision in United
States v. Leonard, and arguing that any position that a syndicated TIC interest is not a
security ignores reality).
216. Leonard, 529 F.3d at 90.
217. Id. at 89.
218. Id. (emphasis added).
219. See supra note 197.
220. See, e.g., Banghart v. Hollywood Gen. P'ship, 902 F.2d 805, 807-08 (10th Cir.
1990); Hocking v. Dubois, 885 F.2d 1449, 1460-61 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494
U.S. 1078 (1990); Rivanna Trawlers Unlimited v. Thompson Trawlers, Inc., 840 F.2d
236, 240-42 (4th Cir. 1988); Odom v. Slavik, 703 F.2d 212, 214-16 (6th Cir. 1983)
(adopting the Fifth Circuit's dicta from Williamson); Gordon v. Terry, 684 F.2d 736, 740-
41 (11th Cir. 1982).
221. See SEC v. Aqua-Sonic Prods. Corp., 687 F.2d 577, 584 (2d. Cir. 1982) (reason-
ing that an application of Williamson would deprive investors of the laws that were enact-
ed for their benefit).
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Second Circuit's disapproval of the bright line written agreements test is
implicit in Leonard and Aqua-Sonic, the Second Circuit expressly rejected
Williamson's authority as an accurate statement of the law.22 The Second
Circuit criticized Williamson and its progeny for focusing the Howey
analysis on the degree of control provided to investors in the written
agreements governing the investment.223 Instead, the Aqua-Sonic and
Leonard courts distinguished between companies that seek the "passive
investor" and situations where there is a reasonable expectation and
significant exercise of real (not illusory), investor control.224
Applying the written agreements test as set forth in Williamson,
Albanese, and their progeny to TIC transactions is in direct contravention
of the statutory purpose and principles underlying the federal securities
225laws. The target audience approach as articulated by the Second Circuit
is the proper approach for TIC transactions given that inexperienced inve-
stors, baby boomers, and senior retirees are all attracted to TICs by the
prospect of an opportunity to gain wealth through passive investment.2 26 If
the written agreements test were applied to TICs, and the actual control
exercised by the investor was found to be irrelevant to the analysis, then
TIC sponsors could evade coverage of the securities laws simply by giving
investors hollow power in the written agreements, even when the sponsor
is aware that such powers will not in fact be exercised.227
Because TIC sponsors arrange the agreements that govern the invest-
ment, the documents could be purposely structured so as to theoretically
avoid the securities laws.228 When documents are so structured, as the
court pointed out in Leonard, it would be easy for a jury to support the
improper conclusion that a certain investment interest or scheme cannot,
by the terms set forth in the written agreements, be a security. 229 Sponsors
should not be permitted to deprive expectedly passive investors of their
rights, provided by applicable securities laws by simply drafting agree-
ments that act as an obstacle. 23 As the Second Circuit cautioned in Aqua-
222. Id.
223. Id. (rejecting Williamson's authority as an accurate statement of the law).
224. Id. at 585; United States v. Leonard, 529 F.3d 83, 88 (2d Cir. 2008).
225. See Aqua-Sonic, 687 F.2d at 584.
226. See HESHELOW, supra note 3, at 4 (emphasizing that inexperienced baby boom-
ers, retirees, and even younger investors who simply want to enjoy passive income are
attracted to TICs, because, as investors, they can allow managers to run the investment
while they gain cash flow with tax benefits).
227. See Aqua-Sonic, 687 F.2d at 584-85.
228. Steinhause, supra note 215.
229. See United States v. Leonard, 529 F.3d 83, 89 (2d Cir. 2008) (emphasis added).
230. See Aqua-Sonic, 687 F.2d at 584.
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Sonic, "it would circumvent the purposes of the securities laws to exon-
erate defendants who had the guile to insert the requirement that the buyer
contribute a modicum of effort."
231
Moreover, in Leonard, the Second Circuit emphasized that one of the
original promoters of the investment interests at issue in that case testified
at trial that the interests were structured to minimize the possibility that the
investment units would constitute securities-"to get into ... the gray
areas of the securities laws." 232 This is a similar approach to the one taken
by those who offer and sell TICs as securities. 233 Consequently, the
written agreements test equates to a mere legal formality when applied to
TIC transactions. 2 34 The heart of the inquiry under Williamson and Alban-
ese is whether the investor theoretically retains substantial control over the
investment on the face of the written agreements. 235 The problem with this
approach is the emphasis on the word theoretical. Under a theoretical
interpretation, TICs would not constitute investment contracts as long as
the investor has control in theory under the written agreements, even
where the honest expectation and ultimate reality is one of passive
investment.216 While it is true that the land service contracts in Howey
were generally for a ten-year period and some investor rights were limited
23723in other respects, the investors in Howey retained theoretical control.238
Additionally, the Supreme Court did not directly rely upon these factors in
reaching its conclusion. 23 9 While some inquiry into the written agreements
may be necessary to prevent investors from purposely choosing not to
exercise their powers, which would transform a non-security into a
security after the fact, the bright line written agreements test is not proper
for the TIC analysis.
240
231. Id.
232. Leonard, 529 F.3d at 89.
233. Steinhause, supra note 215.
234. See SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 300 (1946).
235. Holden v. Hagopian, 978 F.2d 1115, 1119 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Williamson v.
Tucker, 645 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1981)).
236. But see Leonard, 529 F.3d at 89-90.
237. Howey, 328 U.S. at 296.
238. Id. at 299-300.
239. See id. at 298-300.
240. See Williamson, 645 F.2d at 424 (denying that investments were securities where
sophisticated investors had both contractual power and the ability to exercise power).
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v. The Written Agreements Test Does Not Take TICs Outside
the Purview of Federal Securities Laws
Even if the written agreements test was applied to TIC transactions,
the courts should still find that TICs satisfy the fourth prong of the Howey
test. The focus under Williamson and Albanese is on the investors'
expectations under the written agreements at the time of investment and
"is not directed at what actually transpires after the investment was made
.... ,241 Prior to the close of a TIC property, the sponsor puts in place the
agreements that govern the investment, such as the purchase agreement,
TIC agreement, property management agreement, and asset management
242agreement. The documents used by TIC real estate sponsors are the
same as those used by sponsors that sell TICs as securities. 243 The only
difference between the offer and sale of TICs as security versus real estate
is the channel of distribution. 2 " Ironically, the agreements governing the
operation of securitized TICs are structurally designed for purchasers with
an expectation of passive investment that do not intend to exercise
meaningful control. 45 Therefore, even under the agreements governing
TICs sold as real estate, courts could find that the interests constitute
securities under the Howey test.
Furthermore, even Williamson and Albanese recognize that if the
power to control an investment is merely illusory, then actual control will
be deemed not to exist.246 If actual control is found not to exist after
closing, then the owners clearly rely on the essential managerial efforts of
others, thus satisfying the fourth prong of Howey.247 Those who sell TICs
as real estate argue that if TIC investors can vote to hire and fire a third-
party property manager, to partition the property, or to sell the property,
then the investors are actually in control of the investment.24 8 However,
the mere fact that an investor may have the ability to hire or fire a property
manager or sell his or her interest in the TIC property, in and of itself, is
241. Holden v. Hagopian, 978 F.2d 1115, 1119 n.6 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Koch v.
Hankins, 928 F.2d 1471 (9th Cir. 1991)).
242. See Thorup, supra note 8, at 426.
243. Steinhause, supra note 80.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Albanese v. Fla. Int'l Bank of Orlando, 823 F.2d 408, 412 (11th Cir. 1987);
Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 424 (5th Cir. 1981); see also SEC v. Aqua-Sonic
Prods. Corp., 687 F.2d 577, 583-84 (2d. Cir. 1982).
247. See Albanese, 823 F.2d at 412.
248. See, e.g., Lipton, supra note 87 (arguing that TICs can be structured as real estate
investments and not securities).
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not sufficient to bring an otherwise securitized transaction outside the
purview of the federal securities laws.
249
Unless investors go out and select the property, perform the significant
pre-purchase functions, and then actively manage or exercise control over
the property, TIC investments constitute a security, not an investment in
real estate. 50 This position is bolstered by the fact that TIC investors are
lured in by representations touting the experience and expertise of the
sponsor and the prospect of receiving monthly income with no manage-
ment responsibilities. 251 As it stands now, TIC investors do virtually noth-
ing, while third-party property and asset managers approve leases, collect
and distribute the pro-rata gain and loss to investors, undertake maint-
enance and improvements, and carry out all other day-to-day management
responsibilities. 252 The insignificant control exercised by investors as
compared to the post-purchase efforts exerted by third-parties, affiliated
with the seller or not, is insubstantial for the purposes of the fourth prong
of the Howey test.
253
Moreover, not only is the control set forth in the written agreements
governing TIC investments insubstantial, it is merely illusory254 in that
investors are in fact, unable to exercise such powers. 255 Many TIC
arrangements involve a geographically diverse group of investors.
2 56
While the written agreements governing the investment may individually
give investors certain powers, a group of inexperienced and unknowledge-
able investors cannot realistically come together and actively exercise
meaningful control over the investment. 257 As one prominent industry
authority points out, the concept of illusory control is most easily under-
stood through an illustration of theory versus reality. 258 Here is the idea:
When I was in college and went out on a Saturday night, there was a
"theoretical" possibility that I could date any of the women at the bar
that I met that night. However, there was also reality (enough said). The
same applies here. Is it theoretically possible that all of the TICs
249. See NASD, Notice to Members, supra note 76 (noting that TICs "generally are
securities for the purposes of the federal securities exchange laws and NASD rules").
250. Steinhause, supra note 80.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. See SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946).
254. See Albanese v. Fla. Int'l Bank of Orlando, 823 F.2d 408, 412 (1 1th Cir. 1987);
Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 424 (5th Cir. 1981).
255. See Williamson, 645 F.2d at 424.
256. Steinhause, supra note 80.
257. Id.
258. Id.
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actually manage a piece of real estate? Yes. However, these investors
do not actually manage their investment; that is reality.
259
In the typical non-affiliate TIC transaction, many of the specific
powers given to investors are truly illusory. 26 For instance, since mort-
gage loans obtained by the sponsor on behalf of the owners are typically
securitized later, the loan documents often require investors to obtain
lender approval before selling or transferring their TIC interests. 261 Loan
documents may also require TICs to hold their interests through a LLC
that qualifies as a special purpose entity.262 Furthermore, sponsors are
often required to execute standard guaranties, which prohibit investors
from terminating the property and asset management agreements. 261 Thus,
while the agreements governing the investment may give the TIC power to
vote to sell or transfer the property or terminate the property management
agreements, such control is merely illusory in that it does not actually
exist.264 As a result, even the nominal control that investors are given
exists only in theory because TIC owners are realistically precluded from
exercising their powers.
265
In light of the above legal precedent, the significant pre-purchase
efforts carried out by TIC sponsors, and the degree to which investor
control is both insignificant and illusory, the efforts carried out by the
sponsor and third-parties constitute the "undeniably significant ones, those
essential managerial efforts which affect the failure or success of the
enterprise. ' '266 Thus, for the reasons stated above, TICs constitute invest-
ment contracts under the Howey test and should, therefore, only be offered
and sold as securities under federal law.
267
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Whitman, supra note 81, at 128-29.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. See Steinhouse, supra note 80.
266. SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters, Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir. 1973).
267. See SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 283, 298-99 (1946).
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III. THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD ADOPT THE APPROACH USED IN THIS
NOTE WHEN ANALYZING TIC TRANSACTIONS
The bright line rule adopted in SEC v. Life Partners has no place in the
federal securities laws.2 68 On the other hand, the flexible approach and
liberal construction articulated in SEC v. Mutual Benefits Corp. equitably
balances the competing interests of both the sponsor and the investor.
269
While it may be true that a TIC sponsor's post-purchase efforts more
easily satisfy the fourth prong of Howey, there is no basis for excluding
efforts carried out by the TIC sponsor or others that significantly affect the
profitability of the enterprise.27° Thus, the Supreme Court should adopt the
flexible approach and liberal construction as applied to pre-purchase eff-
orts in Mutual Benefits Corp.27'
This Note does not dispute that the written agreements test may be
appropriate for the analysis of certain investment devices, including gen-
eral partnerships. However, when applied to TIC transactions, the written
agreements test amounts to no more than a bright line rule that directly
contradicts all three of the principles underlying the securities laws as set
272forth above. Like most investors that purchase securities, the passive
nature of TIC investors must be considered when analyzing TICs under
the fourth prong of Howey.273 Rather than deprive inexperienced, passive
investors of the benefits and protections of the laws that were enacted for
their benefit, the Supreme Court should adopt the target audience appr-
oach as articulated in SEC v. Aqua-Sonic Products Corp. and United
274States v. Leonard. The target audience approach is flexible and provides
for a liberal construction that considers substance (reality) over form
(theory), as well as the investor need for disclosure and anti-fraud
protection.2
7 5
In addition to the traditional analysis under the Howey test, when
deciding whether an instrument should properly fall within the scope of
268. See SEC v. Life Partners, Inc., 87 F.3d 536 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
269. SEC v. Mut. Benefits Corp., 408 F.3d 737, 743-44 (11 th Cir. 2005).
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Compare Albanese v. Fla. Nat'l Bank of Orlando, 823 F.2d 408, 410 (11th Cir.
1987), and Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 419-24 (5th Cir. 1981), with SEC v.
Aqua-Sonic Prods. Corp., 687 F.2d 577, 584 (2d. Cir. 1982).
273. See, e.g., Steinhause, supra note 80 (discussing the passive nature of TIC
investors).
274. United States v. Leonard, 529 F.3d 83, 88 (2d. Cir. 2008); Aqua-Sonic, 687 F.2d
at 584.
275. Aqua-Sonic, 687 F.2d at 584.
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the Securities Acts, the Supreme Court has applied the "context" clause
276
, . . . 277
it adopted in SEC v. National Securities, Inc. The "context" clause
analysis considers the existence of other regulatory schemes that would
govern a particular investment instrument in the event that such an instru-
ment was found not to be a security.278 For instance, in International
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel, the Supreme Court held that a comp-
ulsory pension plan was not a security. 279 One of the main reasons for the
holding in Daniel was that the employee pension plan was regulated by
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). 280 The
Daniel Court emphasized that the existence of far-reaching legislation
"governing the use and terms of employee pension plans severely under-
cuts all arguments for extending the Securities Acts to noncontributory,
compulsory pension plans." 281 Since ERISA regulates employee pension
plans and also requires certain disclosures, it was unnecessary to subject
.... 282
pension plans to the requirements of the Securities Acts as well.
Furthermore, in Marine Bank v. Weaver, the Supreme Court consider-
ed whether certificates of deposit were securities within the meaning of
the Securities Acts.283 Citing the Daniel Court's factual application of the
"context" clause, the Marine Bank Court focused its analysis not on the
particular characteristics of the investment instrument, but rather, on the
existence of comprehensive and pervasive federal regulation governing the
284banking industry. Ultimately, the Court concluded that "[it] is unnec-
essary to subject issuers of bank certificates of deposit to liability under
the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws since the holders of
bank certificates of deposit are abundantly protected under federal banking
law. ,,285
276. Congress prefaced the list of securities defined in the Securities Acts with the
phrase "unless the context otherwise requires." Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551,
555, 558-59 (1982) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10)).
277. SEC v. Nat'l Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 466 (1969); see also MARC I. STEINBERG,
SECURITIES REGULATION: LIABILITIES AND REMEDIES §§ 4A-23, 4A-24 (Law Journal
Press 1984 & Supp. 2009).
278. See, e.g., Marine Bank, 455 U.S. at 556-59; Int'l Bd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439
U.S. 551, 569-70 (1979).
279. Daniel, 439 U.S. at 569-70.
280. Id. at 569 (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1030 (2000)).
281. Id. at 569-70.
282. Id.
283. Marine Bank, 455 U.S. at 558-59.
284. Id. at 558 (citing federal regulations that govern various aspects of the banking
industry).
285. STEINBERG, supra note 277, §§ 4A-23, 4A-24 (citing Marine Bank, 455 U.S. at
559).
BETTING THE FARM
By analogy, the regulatory scheme governing real estate is neither as
comprehensive nor as pervasive as the legislation governing the pension
plans in Daniel or the banking industry in Marine Bank.286 The federal
regulations governing real property transactions provide neither the
registration and disclosure requirements nor the anti-fraud provisions that
are necessary to protect the average TIC investor.287 Even if the Supreme
Court were to find that some comprehensive scheme governs the TIC
industry, the "context" clause does not dictate that the anti-fraud
provisions are unnecessary if a comprehensive federal scheme exists
elsewhere. 288 Thus, the Supreme Court should find that TICs are securities
and adopt the approach used in this Note to clarify the characteristics of
securitization within the framework of the Howey test.
CONCLUSION
TICs constitute investment contracts under the Howey test and are
therefore "securities" subject to regulation under the Securities Act of
1933 and the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.289 Offering and selling
TICs as investments in real estate circumvents statutory purpose and
imposes unnecessary risk on investors. The Securities Acts were enacted
as remedial legislation designed to protect those who purchase investment
interests, not those who sell them. Sponsors that offer and sell TICs as
real estate rely on controversial legal conclusions and theoretical factual
circumstances. 291 This practice is in direct contravention of the principles
underlying the Securities Acts.292 Those who endorse and exercise this
counterintuitive, illogical approach should no longer remain free to em-
brace theory and ignore reality.293
286. See Marine Bank, 455 U.S. at 558-59; Daniel, 439 U.S. at 569.
287. See, e.g., Thorup, supra note 8, at 426 (arguing that there are numerous benefits
to investors when TICs are sold as real estate).
288. See, e.g., STEINBERG, supra note 277, §§ 4A-23, 4A-24.
289. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77mm. (2000); Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78oo (2000).
290. See generally Landis, supra note 25 (exploring the legislative history behind the
securities laws).
291. See supra Part II.
292. See supra Part I.B.
293. Steinhause, supra note 80.
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The TIC turf war will continue to be a hotly contested issue and
remain of the utmost importance because TICs currently make-up a multi-
billion dollar sector of the domestic investment landscape and are an
increasingly attractive global alternative to traditional securitized arrange-294
ments. TICs will also undoubtedly increase in popularity among smaller
investors, baby boomers, and senior retirees in the near future.295 The need
for investor protection is greater now than ever.296 Thus, in addition to
recognizing the importance of adhering to the approach used in this Note,
the SEC should also provide new guidance in the TIC investment arena.
2 97
For instance, instead of forcing the federal courts to split hairs in order to
protect investors, the SEC could promulgate a rule providing that TICs
sold to five or more persons must be registered or be otherwise exempt
under the Securities Acts. Instead, the SEC could simply flex its muscles
and issue a definitive ruling stating that all syndicated TICs are securities.
These types of rules or guidance would restore a full-measure of protect-
tion to investors who need it, without interfering with the flow and stabi-
lity of the TIC market. If TIC sponsors are actually exercising the degree
of care warranted under the circumstances, then forcing sponsors to
register TICs, file an exemption, or face the consequences would not be
294. See Berkeley, supra note 10, at 729.
295. See Pederson, supra note 79, at 469.
296. On January 15, 2009, the Idaho State Department of Finance filed a $9.75 million
civil suit against Idaho-based TIC sponsor DBSI Inc. Beth Mattson-Teig, SEC Confirms
TICs as Securities, NAT'L REAL EST. INVESTOR, Jan. 28, 2009, http://nreionline.com
/news/SECTICssecurities/. Although DBSI filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy last fall,
the suit claims that the defendants engaged in a scheme to defraud thousands of investors
through the sale of unregistered securities by unregistered broker-dealers. Id.
297. See OMNI Brokerage No-Action Letter, supra note 29.
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difficult.298 With further guidance clarifying the boundaries of securiti-
zation for investment contracts, the SEC and the Supreme Court can
protect investors, promote success, and preserve the integrity of the TIC
investment market for decades to come.
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298. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (2006) (permitting the sale of restricted and controlled
securities without registration under limited circumstances); id. § 230.144A (pro-viding a
"safe harbor" from the registration requirements of the Securities Act of 1933 for certain
private re-sales of restricted securities to qualified institutional buyers, which are general-
ly large institutional investors with over $100 million in investable assets); see also id. §
230.505 (providing a "safe harbor" from the general requirement that all offerings of
securities be registered with the SEC and exempting certain offerings totaling less than
$5 million from the SEC's registration requirement).
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